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THE WAR AND OUR PATENT LAWS
The European War is instructive as well as destructive. Its
teaching is very general. We are a complacent people,--in some
respects we are a most bumptiously conceited people. Before
this war our spread-eagle sufficiency was rampant. The small
storekeeper at the cross-roads handed out the information along
with a pair of blue overalls that "we can lick the rest of the
world in no time." That blatant patriot is now discovering that
he cannot sell blue overalls; he can sell gray or butternut, but
not blue. He did not know that so simple a thing as the color
of a pair of breeches involved international relations and inter-
national interdependency.
One of the few blessings of this unspeakable war is an awak-
ening of the public mind to the inadequacy of our patent sys-
tem; and it may be that this public mind has been galvanized
sufficiently to make it perceptive of some constructive statement.
To establish a point of departure, let us take a typical and not
uncommon case. I go to my druggist for a remedy for which
I have paid twenty-five cents a dozen tablets in the past, and
now find I must pay double that price. Still later I go for
more and cannot get them at any price. Why? Because that
particular drug is patented in the United States, made exclusively
in Germany and exported therefrom by a powerful drug con-
cern which holds that patent and will neither manufacture in the
United States nor permit any one else so to do.
In times of peace this concern charges a price for this drug
vhich makes twenty-five cents a dozen the necessary retail price.
Prefatory note.-This paper is not a review of our patent system; neither
is it the ordinary type of discussion of a patent-law question. It follows
rather the suggestion of Judge Swayze, in addressing the graduating class
of the Yale Law School last year, that "We already look to the law
reviews from the various law schools for the scholarly and scientific
discussion and development of the law rather than the opinions of the
courts." Yale Law Journal, Nov., s915, p. 19.
By taking a specific and confessed defect, given special emphasis by the
European war, it undertakes to show (i) that proposed remedial legisla-
tion affecting organic law fails when directed against specific evils or
individuals; (2) that only with a broad, unbiased, constructive vision can
a remedial act be drawn; (3) that such evils are met by removing the
motive, rather than attempted inhibition of conditions which are normal
consequences of improper, inadequate, or archaic statute. It is, therefore,
I trust, suggestive on broad lines to the lawyer as a legislator.
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There is no contract resale-price regulation, for the wholesale
price automatically fixes that figure, while the actual production
cost probably does not exceed that price per thousand. In time
of war, when this German concern cannot export, the American
public, which has over-graciously given this foreign corpora-
tion a closed monopoly, cannot buy at any price, nor can it manu-
facture.
This illustration is a class-specimen of a genus our patent laws
have created; and from it, and without limiting it to acts of
foreign holders of United States patents, I may state this general
proposition:
Our patent laws permit any owner of a United States patent,
whether citizen or foreigner, to lock it up for 17 years, and to
deny to the American people, if he chooses, that which every
other country may enjoy to the full during that period. Or, by
a dominating, generic patent, he may stop the wheels of prog-
ress in that particular art in the United States for 17 years,
while the rest of the world goes forward.
Herein lies a large cause of the superiority of Germany and
France in many arts, and why a general war in Europe leaves
many American industries crippled. Prior to this war any sug-
gestion that any foreign country was leagues in advance of us
in any art would have been scouted by all but a very few.
Another consideration: During recent years efforts have been
mnade by the committees on patents in the Congress to remedy
certain evils which have grown up about the patent monopoly.
Notable among these is the Oldfield Bill of the Sixty-third Con-
gress. This bill sought, among other things, to inhibit uncon-
scionable monopoly sheltering itself under the patent laws by
a compulsory license provision, best understood by quoting its
main features:
Sec. 3. That the district court wherein the owner of
a patent or of any interest therein is an inhabitant or may
be found, shall have jurisdiction to compel the grant-
ing of a license under such patent under the circumstances
hereinafter set forth.
The person applying for such license shall file a bill
in equity setting forth briefly the facts and circumstances,
and the court shall thereupon hear the person applying
for such license and the owner of the patent. If the appli-
cant shall allege and prove to the satisfaction of the court
that the patented invention is being withheld or sup-
pressed by the owner of the patent, or those claiming under
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him, for the purpose or with the result of preventing any
other person from using the patented process, or making,
using, and selling the patented article in the United States
in competition with another article or process, patented
or unpatented, used, or made, used, and sold, in the United
States by the owner of the patent or those claiming under
him or authorized by him, and also allege and prove that
the application for said patent was filed in this country
more than three years prior to the filing of such bill in
equity, the court shall order the owner of the patent to
grant a license to the applicant in such form and upon such
terms as to the duration of the license, the amount of
royalty, the security for payment thereof, and otherwise
as the court, having regard to the nature of the invention
and the circumstances of the case, deems just: Provided,
however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed
to authorize the court to compel the granting of a license
by the original inventor who has not obligated himself or
empowered another person to suppress or withhold such
invention.
This provision, as clearly appears from the numerous and inter-
esting committee hearings, was directed against the "monopoly
of monopolies," by such great concerns as General Electric, Inter-
national Harvester, Western Electric, Shoe Machinery and
others-all of whom keep in cold-storage thousands of patents.
Bitter opposition to this section came from eminent patent attor-
neys and manufacturers, and it failed to become law. While a
great part of the opposition came from patent attorneys who
represent big business, it must be conceded that they had the best
of the argument, and also that they evinced a sincere broad-mind-
edness worthy of our calling.
I desire to point out why this section of the Oldfield Bill failed,
and, inferentially, why such proposed legislation inevitably must
fail. Merely noting the fact that it is of exceeding doubtful con-
stitutionality, note these facts:
First, in effect, the section amounts to shooting at the wolf in
the flock with a shot-gun. Whether it would kill the wolf or not,
it most certainly would wound or kill some of the sheep. Inevit-
ably, opening the way for such attack upon great corporations
must also open the way for the great corporations to attack and
financially cripple the less strong patent owner, whether the
attempt to compel a license succeeded or not. I am unable to
understand why this fact did not impress the Oldfield Committee
with killing effect.
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Second, this provision is a species of attempted legislation
affecting a class or faction, wholly without generality of appli-
cation. This, in itself, is sufficient to condemn it as an attempt to
revise the organic patent law upon which our genius and industry
so largely depend.
Now, with the evident need of revision of the patent law
brought home to us, is there not some way in which it can be
modernized to the benefit of all? I believe there is; but this
cannot be done while the vision of the law-maker is holding in
focus some special evil, such as unconscionable monopoly or
according to foreign patentee-manufacturers such undue advan-
tage as I have mentioned. Such specific examples serve to
illustrate the need of revision, perhaps suggest lines of legislation;
but never should they be the objective of legislation.
And before passing to my next main point, this is to be con-
sidered in connection with the above section of the Oldfield bill:
Legislation, such as the adoption of a compulsory license pro-
vision, akin to the compulsory license provisions which exist in
several foreign countries, is so distinctly un-American that our
sense of liberty rebels, even if that sense of liberty borders the
laissez-faire still ingrained in our industrial mind. And it must
never be overlooked that, even if a provision of this sort-con-
trary to common sentiment-gets onto the statute books, it
promptly takes its place with the great mass of non-enforced,
non-enforceable laws.
In approaching such a problem, we must abandon the old idea
that a business merely because it is big is therefore pernicious.
Great industries rarely start in a village blacksmith shop. While
it is true that many patent-protected enterprises start small and
grow from the inside out, it is equally true that many industries
must start large and grow at first from outside in. In other
words, there are many industries which can begin only with
enormous capital,--industries which, if they are to compete suc-
cessfully and successfully supply the enormous demands of the
present day, must be big business from the very start. Big busi-
ness, per se, is not only legitimate but absolutely necessary.
But it will be promptly and properly said that such big business
as General Electric with the alleged possession of io,ooo to 15,000
patents, International Harvester with 17,OOO patents (Oldfield
Committee Hearings, pp. 32 and 112), and other concerns less
obnoxious only because their field is smaller, are a menace to
our industrial progress. Grant that such is the case; and then
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let us ask why it is that these great concerns build up such a
fortification of patents. Is it purely and solely because they fear
that those inventions, if outside their control, would eventuate
in successful competition? This is the question which does not
occur to the would-be reformer;'arid in its answer we may get
some wisdom. Assuming the total number of patents owned by
the General Electric to be 15,000, there is not the smallest prob-
ability that if the five per cent or less that they actually use were
kept and the balance abandoned to public use, or even assigned
to another concern, there would arise any substantial business
competition. But what would happen would be the entangle-
ment of General Electric in a hornet's-nest of pestiferous liti-
gation, hampering it in its progress and passing on the cost of
that litigation to the ultimate consumer of electric energy. Such
would be the case with International Harvester or any other big
concern. In short, it is not half so much that these large con-
cerns take out, buy up and store away these vast numbers of
patents to prevent competition as to prevent continual litigation.
If these large concerns and numerous smaller concerns could
be relieved of the burden of suits brought on small improvement
patents which afford no broad basis of industry, they would be
far less inclined to store their vaults with hundreds of patents
which they do not use and never expect to use. Upon this point
the following statement of Mr. Von Briesen, one of our ablest
and experienced patent attorneys, made to the Oldfield Com-
mittee is impregnable:
The 17,ooo patents which the International Harvester
Co. holds sound more formidable than they really are.
Very few of them will stand the test of litigation. They
are mostly a lot of weak patents taken out simply to pre-
serve the equilibrium of the concern and to prevent its
inventions from being wrongfully appropriated by people
who never made them. (Oldfield Committee Hearings,
p. 112.)
In other 'words, the International Harvester Co. knows that
if it does not patent every minor improvement arising from day
to day, some outsider will patent those very things and sub-
ject the company to endless and senseless litigation. The motive,
therefore, is protective, rather than monopolfstic.
Hence, if we are to legislate to remedy this condition along
with others, if we can destroy the motive of the evil we will have
destroyed the evil itself, at least in large measure.
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This extended preliminary discussion has been necessary to
clear the foreground'for what I am now to state.
We grant patents for 17 years, a much longer period than most
countries. We grant them without any requirement of com-
pliance with the very thing the framers of the Constitution had
definitely in mind. When those men undertook to "promote the
progress of science and useful arts," they had not the vaguest
notion that they were providing for the hoarding of progress
for 17 years or any other period; and in "exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries," they had no more
idea that an inventor would patent a thing and lock it up than
that an author would write a book and hide it away to be read
only with his last will and testament. By "exclusive right" they
meant exclusive use, and nothing else.
Let us come at last to a proposed revision of one section of
the patent statute, radically different in range and aim from the
Oldfield provision, and which, in my opinion, with proper word-
ing and with very slight amendment to other sections, will reach
this condition generally, affecting rich and poor, big and small,
alike. The following is Sec. 4884 of the United States Revised
Statutes with my proposed amendments and additions in italics:
Sec. 4884. Every patent shall contain a short title or descrip-
tion of the inventory or discovery, correctly indicating its nature
and design, and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns for
the term of (seventeen) seven years, with the conditional right to
an extension for an additional period of ten years, as hereinafter
in this section provided, of the exclusive right to make, use, and
vend his invention or discovery throughout the United States
and the Territories thereof. A copy of the specification and
drawings shall be annexed to the patent and be a part thereof.
2. Every original grant under this section may be extended
for the additional period of ten years, as herein provided, either
by the patentee, his executors or administrators, or any assignee
of the whole or any part thereof, or any licensee holding
any license or right thereunder, upon due proof to the Commis-
sioner of Patents of any such. right or interest, and upon due proof
that the invention of the patent, or some part thereof distinctly
claimed therein, is regularly and commercially manufactured and
sold, or made and used or employed in manufacture, within the
United States by a person, firm or corporation doing a regular
business within the United States, under conditions of manu-
facture, or use, or under terms of sale or license, in good faith,
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or has been and is being in good faith and with diligence devel-
oped commercially within the United States, and upon proof that
the same is not held, or used, or suppressed in restraint of manu-
facture or trade, or in support of unlawful or inequitable
monopoly.
3. Such extension shall be granted only upon petition duly
verified by such patentee, executor, administrator, assignee or
licensee, or committee of incompetent person, filed in the Patent
Office not earlier than five years after the date of the original
grant, nor later than six years thereafter; and such petition shall
set forth all of the proofs and conditions of paragraph 2, above,
and in addition thereto the names and residences of all persons,
firms, and corporations owning or claiming any interest, legal or
equitable, in said patent, to the best of the petitioner's informa-
tion and belief, and the place or places where and the periods of
time during which, the same has been manufactured, or used, or
sold.
4. It shall be the duty of the Commissioner of Patents to
satisfy himself of the prima facie correctness and sufficiency of
such petition, and upon such finding and coincident with the expi-
ration of said first period of seven years to grant and issue an
extension for an additional period of ten years.
5. Provided however: That any citizen of the United States
of lawful age, or any domestic firm or corporation doing a reg-
ular business within the United States, may file with the Commis-
sioner of Patents within sixty days after the filing of such
petition a duly verified opposition thereto, controverting any
substantial allegation of such petition; and in such case the
Commissioner of Patents shall issue a provisional ten-year exten-
sion of said original grant, and shall forthwith certify to the
judges of the United States district court within which such
petitioner resides such petition and opposition.
6. That thereupon such United States district court shall
record and set down such petition and opposition as and for plead-
ings under Sec. 4915 of the United States Revised Statutes, notify
the parties thereta of such issue by registered mail, and in due
course and as a preferred cause under the rules of such court,
proceed to a hearing and determination of the issue in like man-
ner and with like force and effect as an action brought under said
section to compel the issue of a patent; and that appeal from any
decree therein shall be allowed in like manner, but within thirty
days from the entry of such decree.
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7. That upon the entry of a final and non-appealable decree
therein by such court, a certified copy thereof shall be transmitted
to the Commissioner of Patents by said court; and thereupon the
Commissioner of Patents shall make said provisional extension
full and final or revoke the same in accordance with such decree.
8. It shall be the duty of the Commissioners of Patents to pub-
lish, notice of the filing of every such petition and opposition,
together with the names and addresses of all of the parties, in;
the next following issue of the Official Gazette; and such publi-
cation shall be deemed due and sufficient notice to all persons.
And upon the certification of any such petition and opposition to
a district court, any person not named in such petition, upon show-
ing some interest under said patent, shall be made a party to
such proceeding.
9. This act shall take effect immediately, and shall apply to
all pending patent applications, but shall not apply to any patent
issued prior to this act.
While the effect of such an act is entirely obvious to those
familiar with patent matters, the following should be especially
noted:
First, it would kill and remove from the path of legitimate
progress a vast number of small, impossible, unused patents,
without value to the owners and obstacles to those who are
actually engaged in production.
Second, it would largely remove the incentive to suppress or
hoard great numbers of small patents by large concerns, because
the chief incentive so to do-the prevention of litigation and busi-
ness disturbance-would be removed.
Third, it would throw open to the public, without giving any
license advantage to any individual, all patents which such large
concerns may attempt to hold and suppress.
Fourth, it would completely and entirely eliminate foreign
domination of American industry by large foreign corporations
holding American patents and manufacturing abroad. It will
"promote the progress of science and useful arts," as contem-
plated by the Constitution, rather than permitting the blocking
of such progress by a foreign monopoly by using our generosity
as a club to maintain foreign domination of certain arts.
Fifth, it would encourage the development of patented inven-
tion. This I regard a most valuable feature of such an act. It
is well know that the tendency of a very large number of pat-
entees is, once the patent is secured, to slumber and await some
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possible development without any aggressive act. The patentee
cannot complain, because he has at least six years of absolute
monopoly to exploit his invention. If he cannot do it in that
time, there is small probability he ever can.
Sixth, it stands clear, I believe, of every substantial objection
to the Oldfield bill; it is non-discriminating and is democratic
rather than paternalistic.
Seventh, it is not going back to the old extension system of our
early patent statute; for there the basis of extension resided in an
individual showing of alleged needed extension of the monopoly
in a specific instance-a proposition wholly at variance with the
broad and general provision I have sought to embody.
Eighth, it is devoid of the objections readily raised against the
"working" provisions of the patent acts of certain foreign
countries-provisions which are readily avoided, and which
afford no relief from suppression or monopoly.
Finally, without organic change of the patent statute, it leaves
the patent monopoly absolute in the hands of a legitimate and
industrious owner. It leaves the monopoly absolutely absolute-
if one may so speak-for seven years and leaves the way open
for an extension of the absolute monopoly for an additional ten
years, if the owner in good faith manufactures or uses as the
Constitution contemplates he shall do, and does not attempt to
build up an unconscionable monopoly by misuse of the patent
privilege.
WILLIAM MACOMBER.
BuFFALo, N. Y.
